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SU!'RD!F COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

1 :'\ 'Ill/

-------- o Oo------IWt;.\LJJ c;. Ml TC!!LLL and
K;\THLLE:-I H. ~II1THELL, his wife,

Brief
of
Appellants

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
DOYAL E\'AN STE\V.\RT and
KAREN LEE STEWART, his wife;
and STEWART ~ CO., INC., a
Utah corporation,

)
)
)
)

Case No.
15285

Defendants and Respondents.)

STATEMENT OF TilE Kl"!D UF CASE
This

i~

an action hy appellants to recover damages

for defective horne construction and counterclaims by
respomll·nts for an accounting and trespass.

DISl'llSITIO:--! IN LOWER ())lJRT
.\ Ct e r

c n n s n l ida t e J

t r ial

\v

i t h C i vi l No . 4 31 3 7 , Edward \\' .

Barney :md llclcne Barney, Plaintiffs vs.
ct al.,

Doyal Evan Stewart,

Dclencl.lnts, B:nneYs were granted judgment against

lJclcn·!Jnts dllcl Rcspundents in the sum of $1,615.00 for Breach
.•C l\':1rr.1ntv for Jefcctivc construction,

the tHo counterclaims

of Defendants - Respondents against Plaintiffs -Appellants
wc·rc'

C.:

t

.mis~cd

no caus:, of action and Plaintiffs - Appellants

•cor:pl1 1nt :H~:l ~nst

Defendants v.·as dismissed on the grounds
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damage had not been proven because Appellants had sold the
home since its purchase from Respondents.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek a remand of the case to the trial court
to determine damage for defective construction based upon
the proper rule for measure of damage in implied and

expresse~

breach of warranty cases which is the cost of repair plus
the loss of use and other damage consequently incurred as
the result of the breach.
STATE~ENT

OF fACTS

Respondert< developed, constructed, and
tiffs

':;le'

;·iti<-ll occupants

il

~old

to Plain-

horne situate on rnor,crty

tah County, Utah.
home was recorded on March 12, 1974.

( R~ 2)

The deed to said

(R4 2)

About the same time, Plaint1ffs - Appellants also C0ntracted with Defendants - Respondents to complete the basement of said horne and convert the carport into a garage. (R60'
Said contract was separate and apart from the original contract for the sale of the home.

(R61; T:'lll; 16-24]

Plaintiffs moved into the l:ome in about March l'l74 (T36:
2-9) and discovered various detects 1n the roof \·:hicil caust·d
leaking (Tl6, 23, 21]; a settling front porch <1nd 'i!d<ewalk
(Tl7: 9-13); a peeling and chipped dri

Ch:±

Tl~.

~1-:~];
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unsealed overhanging floor joist and windows which
caused drafts (T25); improperly hung doors (TZB-29);
and improperly located kitchen cahinets (T28-29).
After each defect was discovered, Plaintiffs Appellants notified Defendants - Respondents of the
problems (Tl7:l;

17:15; T3S).

At the same time Plaintiffs - Appellants moved
into the home, Plaintiffs - Appellants built a retaining
wall.

(Tl6:6)
The defects discovered by Plaintiffs - Appellants

caused lc:1king in their home (Tl6); uncomfortable winter
n!Onth5

(T~S);

and the inconvenience in use of doors and

cabinets (T29- 30).
Plaintiffs - Appellants resided in said home for
over 2 1/2 years until August 1976, when they sold same
to Robert Boisen. (T38:24-30)
Prior to trial, an original Defendant State Savings
~

Loan Association, a corporation, was removed from the

case through Stipulation and Order of Dismissal. (R37)
At the consolidated trial herein of this case and
Civil case So. 43137, Barney v. Stewart, et al, numerous
witnesses were called and roof shingles and nails entered
intu C\'idcncc by Plaintiffs- Appellauts to show the
dcicLtt\C'

cOTI~truct.ion

alledged.

(Jd~-36)
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During the trial, Plaintiffs - Appellants objected to
all testimony admitted regarding the subsequent sale of
Plaintiffs -Appellants' home by Plaintiffs -Appellants
to a third party. (T38:18; 39:2; 39:1C>-20) The first counterclaim of Defendants - Respondents was dismissed for failure
to prove damages (T48:21-30; 49:1-23; 61:5-ll) and the
second counterclaim of Defendants - Respondents was dismissed
for failure to show that the retaining wall constructed by
Plaintiffs - Appellants trespassed on property owned by
Defendants- Respondents.

(T48:10-20)

Then, at the close

of the evidence, Plaintiffs - Appellants moved the court for
an order- - ·· · ·-· ·' •
as amenGed,

'J

enl~tling

Rule 37(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
Plaintiffs - Appellants to reasonable

costs and expenses including reasonable attorney fees for
proving facts denied by Defendants - Respondents in Request
for Adm iss ions . ( T 6 3 - 6 4 )
The court took the cases under advisement (T64; R36) and
on April 27, 1977, rendered its memorandum decision granting
Defendants prior Motion to Dismiss stJting among other thing•:
"that Plaintiffs have failec to prove that they suffered~
damages as a result of the allcdged defective construction,
and because they, without repair i ng___?amc ~o 1 d

l!!~_r:_(JJ'~

prior to the time of trial und failed tc• c:-tab.Jish

t:1Jt
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_0_~·

received less from the sale than they would have

received had the Defendants constructed the home in a
m3nner acceptable to them and without the conditions
they complajn of herein.
ad,·i:,e

~'tnchaser

Also, Plaintiffs did not

of the alledged defects they com-

plain of in this action," (R Supplemental Record on
Appeal), and on May 26, 1977, signed and entered its
Findings and Conclusions which stated in part, "there
is no evidence in the record that the sales price would
have been greater had the defects which Plaintiffs claimed
to have been present, not existed.

The record is devoid

of any evidence from which the court could conclude that
the market

v~lue

the sales price

of the lot and residence or that
~auld

have been greater without the claimed

defeLto;_," (Rl7:1-6) stating in its conclusions its
measure of damages as ''the proper measure of damages to the
f'l~tintjffs_bad_Plaintiffs

suffered any damage would have

been the difference het1:een the value of the residence
£l:l!:Chascd

J,,

then with and without the claimed defects or if

!l!_~~~ntiffs

retained ownership of the property, the cost

c.!l. rc·mcdvinr, the defects." (Pl 7:17- 21), and dismissing
Plainriffs -Appellants Complaint
~1<1)

}b,

by

its Decree dated

1"77. (RlS)
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POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COW>liTTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY COt\SIDERDIG
EVIDENCE REGARDii'JG PLAINT! FFS' SUBSEQUENT SALE OF TilE HOME
ORIGINALLY SOLD BY DEFENDANTS DOYAL E\'AN STE\'.'ART AND KAREl\
LEE STEWART TO PLAINTIFFS.
The main question to be decided by the court in this
action is whether the subsequent sale of a home by initial
purchasers of same affects the initial purchaser's right
to recover damages against the original developer-builder
for defective construction.
The court mistakenly was unable to distinguish the
initial sale of the new construction to Plaintiffs and the
as

tl-''l

s:~[-~l a.e~t

Appella~

sale of said construction to third parties

:1ansactions.

The court consolidated tho

cases regarding two homes constructed by Defendants -

Respon~

and awarded damages for defective new construction to Barneys
in Civil No. 43137, Barney v. Stewart, et al, but denied
Plaintiffs -Appellants the right to damage since they had
sold their home prior to trial.
In arriving at the conclusion that Plajntiff5 - :\flJ ellan:
were not entitled to damage, the court mistal,enly

:1e~nd

testi·

many regarding said subsequent sale and therefrom f0und the
following in its memorandum decision:
... Plaintiffs have failed to prove that they suffcr~d
any damage as a result of the alledre~ dtfectiye construction, and because they, without rq,;~irJng same,
sold the property prior to the t imc of tr ;:il :11 ,I fJilcd
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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to establish that they received less from the sale
than they would have received had the Defendants
constructed the home in a manner acceptable to them
and without the conditions they complain of herein.
~lso, Plaintiffs did not advise the purchaser of
the alledged defects they complain of in this action.
(R Subsequent Record on Appeal)
The court further ironiously found:
There is no evidence in the record that the sales

price would have been greater had the defects which
Plaintiffs claimffim have been present not existed.
The record is devoid of any evidence from which the
court could conclude that the market value of the
lot and residence or that the sales price would have
been greater without the Clairred defects. (Rl7)
The trial court then went on in its conclusions to create
its new and novel measure of damages for injury to real
property stating as follows:
The proper measure of damages to the Plaintiffs had
Plaintiffs suffered any damage would have been the
difference between the value of the resid~nce purchased by them with and without the claimffi defects
or if the Plaintiffs retained ownership of the
property, the cost of remedying the defects. (Rl7)
The

~ell

Established Criteria for Determining Damage to Real

Property is Whether the Damage is Temporary or Permanent.
Our own Utah Supreme Court, the Restatement of the Law
oi Contr;1cts, recogni -c:d treatises, and other jurisdictions
hold to the same rul cs.
horJs,

t~c

.'\1

tl,uttgh stated in minor varing

same underlying rule is:

In the event injury

to real 1,roperty is temporary, the measure of damage

is

t h c r o ~· s ,, n ;1 b lc cos t of r era i r I· 1 us an)' cons e que n t i a 1 or
inc icl

'~'

lllc',l'-IJrc

:11 damage,

<~nd

1

f the i n_i ury is permanent, the

of d:H:i<lge 1vould be the differcncC' hetwC'en thC' value
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I

immediately before and the value immediately after the
injury.
Our Utah Supreme Court held to this above rule in
Fuhriman, Inc. vs. Jarrell, 21 U2d Zl8, 445 P2d 136 (Utah
1968) in which the court held:
The measure of damages for improper water proofing
of foundation was correctly based on the cost of
repair even though the tri~l court incorrectly
described damages asdiminution in market value
of dwelling.
The State of Washington in a new-construction breach
of warranty case decided that damages to be allowed for
breach of warrant)
for the c , s t

_-

+

in construction of a new house would be

_. _,- and such other damage as was proved

to be the

~.celt

have been

a~arded

.e,ult of the breach and damages should not
on the basis of the difference in value

of the property before and after.

Christensen vs. l!uskins,

397 P2d 830, 65 Wash. 2d 417 (Wash. 1964).
The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, Section 346(1)
regarding damages recoverable for breach uf

J

cc,nstructiun

contract is often quoted by the courts, and was :co quotc·d in
both our Utah Fuhriman case and the Washington ChristE:nscn
case.

Said restatement section states:
(a)

For defective or unfinished constructtun he can
get judgment for either

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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(i)

(ii)

The reasonable cost of construction and
completion in accordance with the contract
if this is possible and does not involve '
unreasonable economic waste or
The difference between the value that the
product contracted for would have had and
the value of performance that has been
received by the Plaintiff, if construction
and completion in accordance with the
contract would involve unreasonable economic
waste.

McCormick in his treatise on damages also states the
rule as follows:
In whatever way the issue arises, the generally
approved standards for measuring the owner's loss
from defects in the work are two: First, in cases
where the defect is one that can be repaired or
cured without undue expense, so as to make the
building conform to the agreed plan, then the
owner recovers such amount as he has reasonably
expended, or will reasonably have to expend, to
remedy the defect. McCormick on Damages, Section 168,
Page 648.
On the other hand, if the expenditure for reconstruction
is disproportionate to the end to be obtained or would endanger unduly other parts of the building then the measure
of damz:ge would be "the difference between the value of
the building as it is and what it would have been worth if
it had been huilt in conformity with the contract."

McCormick on Damage,Supra.
American Jurisprudence states

the~nerally

accepted

rule as rollows:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Most courts take the view that the measure of damages
for temporary injuries (to real property) is the
cost of repairing the damage or restoring the property
to its original condition.
22 Am. Jur.2d, Damages,
Section 135 and 336 (also Colella vs. King Company,
72 Wash. 2d, 433 P2d 154.)
The same rule is stated in Corpus Juris Secundum thus:
The measure of damages for a permanent injury to real
property ls generally the fair value of the property
immediotely before and immediately after the injury.
The reco\~ry for a temporary injury to real property
is measured by the lo5s sustained to the owner and
may include the cost of restoration if less than the
difference in value, and the diminution in the value
of the use and enjoyment or rental value of the
property during the term the injury exists. 25 C.J.S.
Damages, Section 84.
Plaintiffs - A;'r·ell ants can in their search find no
precedent fJr t'·2 p-•nosition that the subsequent sale of
the home ,, r

·nchased would require the application

of the permaGent damage or excessive economic waste rule
requiring a determination of diminution in value of the
property at the time of the injury, and certainly cannot find
any precedent for the proposition that if a person subsequently
sells a defective item, he must show that he could have sold
the item for more if the item had not been defective.
DamageisDetermined at the Time of the

lni~.

The point in time when damage is determii'Cd is 1·1hcn tl c
injury occurs.

When an individual falls from a

injured at the timE· of the fall.
a defective iron,
the iron.

)H'

1.'

hor~e

her an indi ,. i .'u.J!

is injurrJ at t!1t· tlf"c he ic;

~c

rccc i

\'f_'S

,~eli'.< ~~·d

When an inJividuol n•cclvesa Jcfectivc L ·nc, !.c
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is

Ij

injured at the time the home is delivered.

The damage

accruing to an individual who contracted to receive an
item but received less than he contracted for is the
loss of the benefit of the bargain.

He expected to

receive and bargained to receive something which he did
not fully receive.
The amount of damage which an individual suffers must
be determined at the date of the injury plus any further
damage which flows from the original injury.

This general

rule has been stated as follows:
As a general rule, the damages
upon breach of
contract are to be measured as of the date of the
breach. Under this rule, fluctuations in value
after breach do not affect the recovery allowed.
22 Am. Jur.2d, Damages, Section 52; Gaylord Bulder
vs. Richmond Metal Manufacturing Corp., 140 A2d
358 (Pennsylvama 1958).
The price at which a home was sold 2 l/2 years later
cannot be used as the base price from which damage is
computed.

Nor can the

value

of the home 2 l/2 years

after it was originally delivered to Plaintiffs - Appellants
be considered in determining whether damage occurred
2 l/ 2 years previous.
Predicating a Person's Right to Recover Damages for Defective
Construction Upon Whether or Not He has Possession and
O~nership

i~

of the Defective Property at the Time of Trial,

Arbitrary and Capricious.

The

tri~l

court in this case heard two consolidated
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actions regarding construction
the street from each other.

of two

home~

located across

Both homes were constructed

by and developed by Defendants - Respondents.

The court

granted a judgment for damages to the Barneys who still
maintain possession and ownership of their home, but
stated through its decision, findings, and Conclusions
that because the Mitchells had sold their home prior to
trial, the Mitchells would have to show that they could
have sold their home at a higher value if the damages did
not exist.

Such a requirement is arbitrary and capricious,

discriminator) and illogical.
The mer:
was orig

-~ct

~~at

~ ; ·. ': rt' d

an individual sells his home which
to him in a defect i v e con d i t ion,

should not require that individual to show how much the
home had appreciated in value over the period of time in
1vhich he had held possession, how much improvements he had
put into the property, how much the basis of his property
had been increaoccl from the initi;d purchJ5e, and l,'hJt

1he

home would have subsequently sold for had there not been any
defects.

If this 1;ere the rule to be applied, then the- :.arne\'

who recovered damages for reasonable repair
been required to also shov.· how much their

cost~

should have

hon>~' lLHl

in appraised value, how many improvements t:tc:y ha,J
the home, etc., for the only difference bct\H'cn

tire

incrL·a·.ec'
pL.t

1nto

t~;o :occsoi
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was the fact that one still had their home and the other
had sold it.
Moreover, even if the defects in the home of the
Plaintiffs - Appellants were permanent and irrepairable,
the value of the home at the time of possession would
be the r2levant factor before the court.

The value at

which the home was sold 2 l/2 years hence would not be
relevant to determine that original value.

It has been

said:
In order to be relevant, evidence on an issue
as to the value of real estate must relate to the
time as of which value of the property is to be
determined, or to a time so near thereto that it
may reasonably throw light on the value at such
time, and evidence of value at a time considerably
before or after the time to which the controversy
relates is not admissable unless it also appears
that the value has remained the same. 31A C.J.S.,
Evidence, Section 182(6).
In this case the home purchased by Plaintiffs Appellants from Defendants - Respondents was sold by
Plaintiffs - Appellants more than 2 l/2 years after
same had been originally delivered to Plaintiffs ~ppellants.

(T38:28-30)

The price of the original pur-

chase did not include the completion of a basement and
the conversion of a carport into a garage. (R42:25-27;
R4S·l6-20; Rl23-l24)

The value of the home originally

rece1ved without the garage and basement completed cer-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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But the most important point is that just because the
home was sold by Plaintiffs - Appellants does not mean
that they need to show that the value at which they sold
the home was less than they could have sold it for.

Nor

does it require Plaintiffs - Appellants to prove damages
by the formula of the diminution in value.
Reasonable Cost of Repair Was a Proper Measure of Damages.
The damages testified to by Plaintiff - Appellant
Ronald G. Mitchell were repairable.

They were not per-

manent and irrepairable damages, nor were they damages
which to rerair huuld cost unnecessary economic waste.
The prorer measure of damages in this situation was
the

reas2~:":·

u•~

~f

repair plus any loss of use of

propertyand other lncidental and consequential damage
flowing from the original defects.

The fact that the

roof leaked and had to be rq•aired, the inconvenience of
the leakage, the uncomfortableness of the drafts, the inconvenience and uncumfortableness of the improperly hung
doors and cabinets, all were the proper measure of damage.
Our court has said regarding damage that it shuuld
be computed in the easiest possible wa).

Our court

ha~

said:
Sreaking generally about d;n1age~;, ll:e desired objective
is to evalu2te an) loc;c suffered h) the most direct,
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practical, and accurate method that can be
employed. Even Odds Inc. vs. Nielson,
448 P2d /0~, 22 U2d 49 (Utah 1968).
The most direct, practical, and accurate method

for determining damage in real estate injury cases of this
nature has been repeatedly stated as the cost of repair
unless the injury is permanent and unrepairable.
~nd

there is no measure of damages stated which would

require a determination that the amount at which the property
was s11bsequently sold was less than the amount at which it
could have been sold.
Original Purchase and Subsequent Sale Are Two Separate
Transactions Involving Two Separate Sets of Rights and
!Zesponsibilities.
Plaintiffs - Appellants bought a newly constructed
horne developed and built by Defendants - Respondents.
Defendants - Respondents sold said newly constructed home
to Plaintiffs - Appellants for a certain price.

The

home was to be completed in a good workmanlike manner as
is recognized by implied warranties for new construction
sold initially to the public. (See Annotation of liability
uf builder vendor or other vendor of new dwelling for loss,
injurv, or damage occasioned by defective condition
thucof, 25 ALJ<.3d 383, et seq.)
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If the home delivered to Plaintiffs - Appellants was
defective in workmanship, Plaintiffs - Appellants received
less than they bargained for, and if said defects were
repairable, which they were in this case, the damage to
Plaintiffs - Appellants was the reasonable cost of repair.
Plaintiffs - Appellants sold their home to thi1d
parties.

The transaction between Plaintiffs -Appellants

and the third parties is a separate contractual arrangement
and if Plaintiffs - Appellants sold said home to the
third parties by fraud or misrepresentation, the third parties
would have a right of action against Plaintiffs - Appellants
for sald fr;,
would

~·.1.

L~

CT

A~~t

rr:isrepresentation.

The right of action

hith the third parties to contest any

impropriety in the sale of the home to them by Plaintiffs
Appellants.
But the Plaintiffs - Appellants were initially injured
by the Defendants - Respondents. If the premises originally
delivered to them were defective,

they are entitled to

compensation from Defendants - Respondents for any defects.
The third parties who purchased the property the second
time are subject to all of the defenses and entitled to all
of the benefits of the legal theories of

caveat emptor, fraui

misrepresentation, breach of contract, etc., to recover from
Plaintiffs -Appellants for any di3sut i~laction they have ~i~
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the purchase contract with Plaintiffs - Appellants.
The court however, attempts to create a duty
upon Plaintiffs - Appellants to advise the third parties
of any alledged defects (R Subsequent Record on Appeal)
when the court said in its memorandum decision of April 27,
1977, "Also, Plaintiffs did not advise the purchaser of
the alledged defects they complain of in this action."
The court further in its findings stated "The records
sho~

that the Plaintiffs disclaimed any liability to

their grantees for any defective conditions of the house
or the cement or the driveway." (Rl7)
The above findings are irrelevant to the issues before
the court and were not properly considered.
Conclusion.
The consideration by the court of the subsequent sale
of the home of Plaintiffs - Appellants to third parties
as

not correct.

The court created an improper measure of

damages theory.
Plaintiffs - Appellants should be entitled to damages
based upon the reasonable cost of repair.

The case should

be remanded to determine said damage in accordance with the
record.
Real property appreciates in value, certain items of
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personal property appreciate in value, improvements arc made
to real property, and other transactions enter in after a

person receives the benefit or a partial benefit of a
bargain.

An individual should not be precluded from damages

for failure to receive the full benefit of the bargain because he subsequently sells the item received.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT CO~IITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING TO
AWARD PLAINTIFFS THEIR COSTS FOR SUCCESSFULLY DEFENDING
AGAINST THE COUNTERCLAIMS OF DEFENDANTS.
The counterclaims brought by Defendants were (1) that
Plaintiffs - Appellants owed Defendants - Respondents
compensation not yet paid for completion of the basement
and conversion of a carport into a garage on the home purchased by Plaintiffs - Appellants from Defendants Respondents, and (2) Plaintiffs - Appellants trespassed
upon property owned by Defendants - Respondents by constructing
a concrete wall thereon. (Rl23-127)
Both of these counterclaims were dismissed by the
court at trial without the necessity of Plaintiffs - Appellants
putting on a defense. (T48, 49,

& 61)

Plaintiffs - Appellants feel that they were entitled
to award of costs in successfully defending against said
counterclaims.

Said award of costs is provided for in

Rule S4(d)(l) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended and states:
Except when express provision therefor is made
either in a statute of this state or in these
rules, costs shall be allowed as of course to
the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs. Rule 54(d)(l), URCP, as amended.
The court did make no directions in its Decision,
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Findings, Conclusions, or Judgment that costs should not be
awarded to Plaintiffs - Appellants for prevailing on their
counterclaims.
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY FAILING
TO AWARD PLAINTIFFS THEIR EXPENSES INCLUDING REASONABLE
ATTORNEY FEES FOR PROVING THE TRUTHFULNESS OF REQUESTS
FOR ADMISSIONS DENIED BY DEFENDANTS PERTAINING TO THE
COUNTERCLAIMS OF DEFENDANTS DISMISSED AT TRIAL.
At the end of the trial herein, Plaintiffs Appellants moved the court for an order awarding Plaintiffs Appellants their expenses including reasonable attorney fees
for proving the truthfulness of Requests,for Admissions
denied by Defendants - Respondents. (T63-64)
Plaintiffs - Appellants feel that the court errored
in failing to pass upon said motion by either denying or
affirming same.

The court failed in its Decision, Findings,

Conclusions, or Judgment to render decision regarding said
motion. (R Supplemental Record on Appeal; 16-17; and 15)
Rule 37(c) URCP, as amended, states:
If a party fails to admit the genuineress of any document
or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36,
and if the party requesting the Admissions thereafter
proves the genuineness of the document or the truth of
the matter, he may apply to the court for an order
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable
expenses incurred in making that proof, including
reasonable attorney fees. The court shall make the
order unless it finds that (1) the request was held
objectional pursuant to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission
sought was of no substantial importance, or (3) the
party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on the matter, or (4) there
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was other good reason for the failure to admit.
Rule 37(c), URCP, ~amended.
The court made no such findings as required by the rule
and Plaintiffs - Appellants feel that they are entitled to
Findings by the court, Conclusions, and granting or denial
of their Motion.
Plaintiffs - Appellants also feel that since the counterclaims of Defendants - Respondents were dismissed after the
allegations of same proved fruitless, their expenses including
reasonable attorney fees should have been awarded by the court
or at least Findings, Conclusions, and and Order made

regardi~

their mot1sn for same.
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CONCLUSION
The major point of contention of Plaintiffs Appellants is that the court errored in looking at the
subsequent sale of the home in question to third parties,
that the court considered an improper measure of damages,
and that the proper measure of damages should have been
the reasonable cost of repair.
The question of awarding of costs when an individual
prevails on a counterclaim and the question of making
Findings, Conclusions, and an Order denying or granting
an Order under Rule 37(c) are fundamental and the requirement to do so should be made clear by the Supreme Court.
THEREFORE, PLAINTIFFS - APPELLANTS PRAY that this case
be remanded to the court to determine damages in accordance
with the reasonable cost of repair,andm validating the
court's mistaken measure of damages.
Respectfully Submitted,
McCune &McCune
96 East 100 South
Provo, Utah 84601
Attorneys for Appellants
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